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INTRODUCTION 
One aspect of the problem in trying to align a corporate investment 
horizon (the time period for return on investment) to that of its 
shareholders is the enormous range of investor time horizons, which can 
range from milliseconds to centuries. Flash (high-frequency) traders hold 
shares for milliseconds, day traders for a few hours or days, some mutual 
funds and other institutional investors show a holding period limited to a 
few months to a year, and private equity and most mutual funds seem 
generally limited to three to five years. Beyond that, some actively 
managed mutual funds may be up to ten years, as evidenced by turnover 
ratios. Passively-managed index funds are oblivious to time periods, 
leaving that decision entirely to the index makers, which might range from 
a year or so for shifting indices like small cap value versus small cap 
growth sectors to total market indices that have few changes over ten to 
thirty years or longer. University endowments may have a century-length 
horizon.1 Whose horizon controls? Should officers and directors be 
obliged to make decisions that will increase shareholder value (i.e. stock 
price) today or this week or this quarter or this year or this decade or this 
century or somehow weigh the various shareholders’ diverse interests in 
                                                     
* Clinical Associate Professor, Georgia State University, J. Mack Robinson College of Business and 
College of Law (secondary appointment). 
** Professor and Director of the Reiman School of Finance University of Denver, Daniels College of 
Business. 
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APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 2 (2000) [hereinafter SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO 
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some weighted period pro rata to those interests? Besides, the beneficial 
owner of those shares is often very far removed from the actual owner,2 as 
with 401(k) investors owning mutual funds through their employer-
provided plans, held by trustees, recorded by institutional record keepers, 
managed by mutual funds managers under contract to the fund companies, 
with the actual securities held by custodian banks (and even then stock 
shares may be loaned to other investors). The chain of nominal owner to 
title holder to custodian to equitable owner is quite long. 
A second aspect of the problem is whether ownership of shares 
equates to ownership of the corporation. Does a corporation actually have 
owners or need owners?3 Stockholders are presumed to own the company; 
this is certainly so for closely-held corporations where ownership and 
management are co-existent,4 but it is rather doubtful for publicly-traded 
corporations (also called “entrepreneurial” and “managerial”).5 Berle and 
Means elucidated, the widely-dispersed ownership of shares in the modern 
corporation creates a separation between ownership and management 
(control) in which “the shareholder . . . has surrendered a set of definite 
rights for a set of indefinite expectations.”6 Thus, shareholders have 
“interests” “in the form of distributions and what appraisal an open market 
will make of these expectations.”7 Interests are not the same as ownership. 
Consequently, for publicly-traded companies, a share certificate does not 
actually convey ownership of the corporation. Berle and Means long ago 
stated this, quoting from an earlier writer:  
                                                     
2. Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership, 95 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 50, 53 (2017). 
 3. E.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Public Corporations and Their 
Shareholders, 65 MD. L. REV. 538, 538–39 (2006). 
 4. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 70 (1933). Berle made the distinction sharper in a later article:  
[P]roperty has now split into two distinct categories. One class may be called active — the 
farm, the little business, the collection of tangible property which the owner can himself 
possess, manage, and deal with. The other may be called passive — a set of economic 
expectations evidenced by a stock certificate or a bond, each representing an infinitesimal 
claim on massed industrial wealth and funneled income-stream. The owner of passive 
property is helpless to do anything with it or about it, except to sell for what the security 
markets will let him have.  
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365, 1369–70 (1932) (footnotes omitted). 
 5. See, e.g., MICHEL AGLIETTA & ANTOINE REBÉRIOUX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT, A 
CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 35 (2005); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory 
of the Firm: Critical Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475–76, 1494 (1989). 
 6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 277, 287. 
 7. Id. at 170, 286–87. 
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No one is a permanent owner. The composition of the 
thousandfold complex which functions as lord of the 
undertaking is in a state of flux. . . . The claims to 
ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and are so 
mobile, that the enterprise assumes an independent life, as 
if it belonged to no one . . . . 8  
 
Share classes that give extra weight to certain classes, such as newer 
technology and media companies that are still owned and managed by the 
founders or their scions, are a different species of corporate ownership 
closer to privately-held founder-led companies than the widely-dispersed 
shareholders of the Berle and Means modern corporation model. 
A third aspect of the problem is that, despite the theories and 
advocacy of shareholders being owners, based on the agency model of 
corporate finance first developed in the 1970s, the theory is contrary to 
corporate law. As we explain below, those theories were based on a 
theoretical assumption—actually a fiction—that shareholders owned the 
corporation because this fit the agency theory. After all, if there is an agent 
(management), then there must be a principal (shareholders). Even Berle 
and Means relied on that fiction (and invented it) for a different reason 
than Michael Jensen and others later did. But long-standing corporate law, 
unchanged even during the agency model heydays, gives no such role to 
the shareholders, and the directors are not agents of the shareholders but 
are fiduciaries to the corporation itself, in effect making the corporation a 
conservatorship as far as the directors’ duties to put the corporation’s 
interest foremost. 
These three aspects will be developed in this Article to urge that the 
question of investor time horizons should be largely irrelevant to the 
corporate investment decisions for publicly-traded corporations. Instead, 
directors should abide by their corporate-law mandated fiduciary duties to 
invest and manage the company in the company’s own best interest. This 
looks more like a conservatorship of the corporation itself and less like a 
principal–agent relationship. The conservatorship should consider the best 
interests of the corporation, various classes of shareholders (common and 
preferred), other investors of capital (debt holders), and other stakeholders. 
I. THE HETEROGENEITY OF SHAREHOLDER TIME HORIZONS 
The average investor holding period for a share of stock is 200 days,9 
but the average does not provide much help in addressing the question of 
                                                     
 8. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 352 (quotation omitted). 
 9. Quick and Dirty, ECONOMIST (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/business/ 
21708287-are-companies-too-short-termist-quick-and-dirty [https://perma.cc/TCF6-84NK]. 
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aligning director duties to shareholder time horizons. The reason is that 
shareholder time horizons vary enormously. On the short-time side are 
traders who hold shares from microseconds to up to a week. That is not 
much of a time horizon, but, nevertheless, such rapid traders are 
stockholders. High frequency trading (HFT) strategies hold shares for 
microseconds to milliseconds or, at most, for a few hours and account for 
55% of the trading volume in the U.S. markets;10 the average holding 
period is eleven seconds.11 It seems entirely logical to conclude that these 
traders have no interest in the underlying assets of the corporation itself. 
Their interest lies more in the technical issues, such as the “spread” in price 
between bid and ask for the shares, and the opportunity to trade so as to 
capture some of that spread, otherwise called “skimming.”12 As Miller and 
Shorter explain, 
 
In general, traders that employ HFT strategies are 
attempting to earn small amount of profit per trade. Some 
arbitrage strategies reportedly can earn profits close to 
100% of the time. Earlier reports indicated that such 
strategies might make money on only 51% of the trades, 
but because the trades are transacted hundreds or 
thousands of times per day, the strategies may still be 
profitable.13  
 
Michael Lewis in his book Flash Boys lists several categories of 
“predatory behavior” done with HFT (electronic front running, rebate 
arbitrate, and slow-market arbitrage).14 A holding period of milliseconds 
or microseconds—with or without predatory behavior— has no regard for 
how the company is managed and cannot possibly align with 
management’s investment period. 
                                                     
 10. RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, CON. RESEARCH SERV., HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING: 
OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44443.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KVM7-G7PZ]. 
 11. Barry Ritholtz, Speed Trading in a Rigged Market, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2014), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-03-31/speed-trading-in-a-rigged-market [http:// 
perma.cc/6KQT-5EYG]. 
 12. Id. 
 13. MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 10, at 2. 
 14. MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 172 (2014). 
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Day traders hold stocks for seconds to minutes.15 Some day traders 
are “long-term,” holding shares for one to five days.16 Various factors are 
used in deciding whether to buy or sell, based on things such as moving 
averages, trading volume, and momentum,17 none of which seem to have 
anything to do with how the company itself is being managed and cannot 
possibly align with the management’s investment period. “You’ll take no 
interest in a company’s products or in the underlying long-term 
fundamentals of growing corn. You’re simply dealing in a security, buying 
it low and selling it high[,]” wrote one author on how to day trade.18 
Individual investors currently own about 30% of the shares in 
publicly-traded corporations; the balance is held by institutions, most of 
whom hold for the benefit of individuals (such as a mutual fund).19 
Institutional investors are defined as companies managing assets over 
$100 million.20 Mutual funds (domestic equities) hold $6,414.9 billion in 
stock, according to the Federal Reserve.21 Private pension funds (equities) 
hold $2,372.3 billion in stock.22 All U.S.-registered investment companies 
owned 31% of the U.S. corporate equities in 2016,23 of which mutual funds 
hold $1,776 billion in defined contribution equity assets plus some 
unstated equity percentage in hybrid funds whose value is $988 billion.24 
An additional $1.547 trillion is in IRA equity accounts plus some unstated 
percentage in hybrid accounts whose value is $831 billion.25 Equity 
holdings in variable annuity mutual funds (which presumably are intended 
                                                     
 15. Day Trading: Your Dollars at Risk, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 20, 2005), 
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsdaytipshtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/UFW3-PS6E]. 
 16. MICHAEL SINCERE & DERON WAGNER, THE LONG-TERM DAY TRADER: SHORT-TERM 
STRATEGIES TO BOOST YOUR LONG-TERM PROFITS 10 (2000) (ebook). 
 17. See, e.g., OLIVER VELEZ & GREG CAPRA, TOOLS AND TACTICS FOR THE MASTER DAY 
TRADER 11 (2000). 
         18. JACOB BERNSTEIN, THE ULTIMATE DAY TRADER: HOW TO ACHIEVE CONSISTENT DAY 
TRADING PROFITS IN STOCKS, FOREX AND COMMODITIES 21–22 (2009). 
 19. Bower & Paine, supra note 2; Gretchen Morgenson, Small Investors Support Boards, But 
Few Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/business/small-
investors.html. 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2011). 
 21. Financial Accounts Guide, L.122 Mutual Funds, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. 
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/DisplayTable.aspx?t=l.122 [https://perma.cc/39YW-
UVBF]. 
 22. Financial Accounts Guide, L.118 Private Pension Funds, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/DisplayTable.aspx?t=l.118 [https://perma. 
cc/B5PS-MEC5]. 
 23. INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 13 (2017), https://www.ici.org/ 
pdf/2017_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RXJ-QU62]. 
 24. Id. at 232. 
 25. Id. at 233. 
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also as retirement vehicles) total approximately $1,673 billion plus an 
unstated percentage in hybrid accounts.26 
For individual investors, two factors seem most relevant to ascertain 
holding periods. One is how often individuals sell their mutual fund 
positions, which can reflect either their intended holding period or their 
tolerance of underperformance by the fund. If mutual fund investors’ 
selling of shares is large or rapid enough, the selling could drive the 
portfolio manager to sell the stock holdings of the fund. This cash flow out 
of mutual needs to be examined in the context of the offsetting buying of 
shares of the fund by other individuals. More broadly, the buying and 
selling of mutual fund shares can occur in the context of fund investment 
approach, which has recently been the case with many investors selling 
actively managed funds and buying lower-cost index funds. Recent studies 
show that investors have sold $355 billion in active mutual funds and 
bought $337 billion in passive (index) mutual funds in 2016.27 
A second factor to consider in determining investor holding periods 
is the mutual fund portfolio turnover ratio, which reflects both the fund 
manager’s holding period and indirectly the tolerance of the fund’s 
shareholders for underperformance. Turnover ratios for actively-managed 
funds range from under 10% to over 200% with growth mutual funds 
tending towards the higher turnover ratios and large-capitalization value 
funds tending towards the lower turnover ratios.28 Turnover ratios for 
passive (index) funds follow the change in holdings set by the index 
maker, which, if the index tracks some slice of the market (e.g. small-cap 
value, mid-cap growth, etc.), adjusts based on representative stocks for 
that index, changes market capitalization of the individual stocks within 
that index and affects sales or mergers of individual stocks or those taken 
private (and thus off the exchange) or suspended or withdrawn due to 
bankruptcy.29 Thus, a total stock market index has very low turnover ratio 
and consequently little change in holdings,30 while a sector index (whether 
                                                     
 26. INV. CO. INST., supra note 23, at 227. 
 27. Charles Stein, When Bad Things Happen to Good Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 
12, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-12/when-bad-things-happen-to-good-
funds. Flows out and flows in do not necessarily prove money moved from active to passive funds. 
Possibly some of the active money was drawn out by older retirees to spend, while newer savers put 
new money into passive funds.  
28. Turnover Ratio, MORNINGSTAR, http://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/turnoverratio. 
aspx; William F. Sharpe, Morningstar’s Performance Measures, Fund Characteristics, https://web. 
stanford.edu/~wfsharpe/art/stars/stars4.htm [https://perma.cc/4LGE-KLGE].  
29. See, e.g., JOHN BOGLE, BOGLE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 180–85 (1994); Albert S. Neubert, 
Benchmarks: Definitions and Methodologies, in INDEXING FOR MAXIMUM INVESTMENT RESULTS 19–
35 (Albert S. Neubert ed., 1998). 
 30. A low-turnover fund has tax advantages when held in a taxable account, but it does have the 
risk that the undistributed large capital gains might hit a recent investor in the fund if those gains are 
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split as value or growth, or mid-cap versus small-cap) will vary as those 
individual stocks grow or slide from value to growth or back to value and 
from small-cap to mid-cap to large cap or back down. 
Mutual funds may also be segmented into investment objectives so 
that target date funds do have a targeted holding period as stated in the 
prospectus (and obviously the target date itself), though some funds view 
that date as a redemption date and others as a glide path to a conservative 
investment strategy that will last another thirty years in retirement.31  
“Retirement accounts and plans held about 37% of U.S. stocks in 2015, 
worth roughly $8.4 trillion.”32 The table below shows target date funds 
from some of the major mutual fund companies; the left column indicates 
what those investment horizons are based on those dates.33 
Target Date Funds 
Retirement Dates 
 
Investment 
Horizon to 
Retirement 
Investment 
Horizon Plus 25 
years in 
Retirement 
BLACK-
ROCK 
 
FIDELITY T. ROWE 
PRICE 
TIAA-
CREF 
VAN-
GUARD 
3 years  28 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 
8 33 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 
                                                     
actually distributed. To the converse, the benefit of the capital gains tax rate against ordinary short-
term gains tax rate is lost if the fund is held in a tax-favored retirement account, although there are still 
good investment reasons to hold index funds in retirement accounts. See BOGLE, supra note 29, at 
217–18; CHARLES R. SCHWAB, CHARLES SCHWAB’S GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE 142–45 
(1998); Lawrence R. Hudack & Duane M. Ponko, Focus on Aftertax Returns from Nonretirement 
Investments in Mutual Equity Funds, 68 CPA J. 76 (Nov. 1998).  
 31. See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., supra note 23; Wojciech Krawiec, Target Date Funds 2055 - Same 
Target Year, Different Glide Paths, 35 RES. PAPERS WROCLAW U. ECON. 77, 79 (2014).  
 32. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. Corporate 
Stock, TAX NOTES, May 16, 2016, at 923, 928. 
33. LifePath Target Date Funds, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/investing/financial-
professionals/defined-contribution/lifepath-target-date-funds [https://perma.cc/EG8S-LZWN]; How 
Fidelity Manages Freedom Funds, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/fidelity-fund-
portfolios/freedom-funds-manage [https://perma.cc/9C5H-4D73]; Target Date Funds, 
T.ROWEPRICE, https://www3.troweprice.com/usis/personal-investing/mutual-funds/target-date-
funds.html [https://perma.cc/C93F-W9M7]; Performance: Mutual Funds and In-Plan Annuities, 
TEACHERS INS. & ANNUITY ASS’N AMERICA, https://www.tiaa.org/public/investment-
performance?defaultview=mfinstonly [https://perma.cc/G4PX-2TR8]; Vanguard Target Retirement 
Funds, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/target-retirement/#/ [https://perma. 
cc/H738-J3X9]. 
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13 38 2030 2030 2030 2030 2030 
18 43 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 
23 48 2040 2040 2040 2040 2040 
28 53 2045 2045 2045 2045 2045 
33 58 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 
38 63 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 
43 68 2060 2060 2060 2060 2060 
 
Individuals may have entirely different reasons for investment 
holding periods than firms or mutual funds. In financial planning, 
investors may invest for particular purposes, such as saving for a down 
payment for a house, for college tuition for children, for retirement, for 
asset allocation and rebalancing, and for other major purchases. Thus, the 
same investor may have multiple horizons ranging from five to thirty-five 
years. The many households that invest have an even wider variety of 
goals, time horizons, and risk tolerances. The Investment Company 
Institute’s 2017 Fact Book notes:  
[H]ouseholds often use mutual funds to save for the long 
term, such as for college or retirement. . . . many long-
term fund shareholders seek the advice of financial 
advisers, who may provide a steadying influence during 
market downturns. These factors are amplified by the fact 
that assets in mutual funds are spread across 94 million 
investors and fund investors have a wide variety of 
individual characteristics (such as age or appetite for risk) 
and goals (such as saving for purchase of a home, for 
education, or for retirement).34 
Pension funds (and annuity providers) have both immediate payment 
demands for current retirees and long-term investment obligations for all 
current employees whose retirement date will range from one year to 
thirty-five years or longer. Similar time horizons might be expected in 
non-traditional corporate forms, such as employee-owned companies 
where stockowners are the current employees and probably some retirees. 
Some companies are mutual, meaning the customers and policyholders are 
also the shareholders. This is common with insurance companies (e.g., 
Northwestern Mutual, State Farm, New York Life, USAA, Massachusetts 
                                                     
 34. INV. CO. INST., supra note 23, at 33. 
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Mutual) and other companies like REI and Vanguard.35 The time horizon 
(if there is one) for employee-owned companies and mutual companies 
would seem to be as long as the customer or policyholder is a member and 
the employee is an owner; but (like target-date funds), this is an endless 
rolling period as new customers/policyholders/employees enlist, so the 
company’s real time horizon is, as New York Life’s webpage says, “for 
generations to come.”36 It further states: 
 
Mutuality means we are collectively and entirely owned by 
our clients, not outside investors. And since we don’t have to 
continually appease the bulls and bears of Wall Street, our 
exclusive focus—every decision we make—is in the best 
interests of our policy owners. 
Being able to look beyond short-term profits to invest for 
the longterm produces results that speak for themselves. 
We’ve amassed a cash reserve in excess of $22 billion. And 
we have unfailingly met our financial obligations for over 
170 years. 
And, we expect, for generations to come. 
The fact is, mutuality is at the core of everything we do. 
It’s what enables us to stand by our principles of humanity 
and integrity every single day. To strive for greatness, but 
never at the expense of goodness. To keep our promises, and 
do what’s right. 
Mutuality also enables our clients to be active participants 
in the life of our company. Those who purchase participating 
policies have the power to elect members of our board of 
directors. And, of course, those policy owners have also 
enjoyed the benefit of annual dividends, which in 2016 
totaled $1.7 billion.37 
 
Institutional investors have other considerations. Institutional 
investors, because of the size of their holdings, may find liquidity is less 
                                                     
35. See, e.g., GEORGE E. REJDA & MICHAEL J. MCNAMARA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND INSURANCE 88–90 (12th ed. 2014); Why Ownership Matters, VANGUARD, 
https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguard-apart/why-ownership-matters/ [https://perma.cc/ 
J8VN-9MQ8]; About REI, REI, https://www.rei.com/about-rei.html [https://perma.cc/Y2BA-DRQE] 
(REI is a co-op). 
36. Mutuality Matters, N.Y. LIFE, https://www.newyorklife.com/about/our-strength/mutuality-
matters/ [https://perma.cc/3JZP-G2BQ]. 
 37. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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of an option due in part to moving the market price merely by exiting a 
position.38  
University endowments will usually have very long time horizons 
plus a need for distributions for current operations.39 Total endowments 
were $515 billion in 2016, which included all assets, not just equities.40 
David Swensen, the portfolio manager of the Yale endowment, puts the 
horizon at “centuries,”41 stating “most educational institutions aspire to 
exist in perpetuity. . . . The perpetual nature of colleges and universities 
makes endowment management one of the investment world’s most 
fascinating endeavors.”42 
Sovereign wealth funds have similar long-term horizons, described 
as “inter-generational” horizons, holding more than $6 trillion in assets;43 
Norway’s fund says “the fund’s investments are about the future and 
belong to our future generations.”44  
While investors have many different holding periods, one study 
found that an investment holding period for stocks is fifteen years to 
reliably beat the risk-free rate of return 95% of the time and even longer 
when investing in large capitalization stock;45 another study put that 
holding period at nineteen years.46 If investors collectively were to have 
an investment time horizon, these studies would direct that the period be 
nearly two decades. For retirement portfolios that may begin at a new 
worker’s age of twenty-five, individual investors and their investment 
                                                     
 38. John Coffee has explored the agency problems inherent in these institutional investor 
arrangements. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1317–18, 1328–29 (1991). 
39. SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 8–10, 14–15. 
 40. 2016 NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments, NAT’L ASS’N COLL. & UNIV. BUS. 
OFFICERS, http://www.nacubo.org/Research/NACUBO-Commonfund_Study_of_Endowments.html 
[https://perma.cc/4WFD-SBLL]. 
 41. SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 42. Id. at 25. 
 43. See TAMARA GOMES, THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS ON INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY 8 (Dec. 2008), http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/ 
01/dp08-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/L29D-LC65]; Nuno Fernandes, The Impact of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds on Corporate Value and Performance, 26 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 76, 83 (2014). The divergence 
of sovereign wealth fund time horizons to that of other investors is also noted in Grant M. Hayden & 
Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote And The False Promise Of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 489–91 (2008). 
 44. Responsibility, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT, https://www.nbim.no/en/responsibility/ 
[https://perma.cc/B4E7-FKKH]. Sovereign wealth funds may create other divergent interests with the 
corporate entity, which is a point not relevant here. See, e.g., Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 
87 N.C.L. REV. 83, 93–95 (2008). 
 45. Bin Li et al., Stock Returns and Holding Periods, 2 JASSA- FINSIA J. APPLIED FIN. 43, 44 
(2012). 
 46. Shen Pu, How Long Is a Long-Term Investment?, 90 ECON. REV. 1, 12 (2005). 
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managers actually will have such a period, particularly if using index 
funds, but otherwise it is doubtful that anyone would actually wait fifteen 
to nineteen years to see how a particular stock investment turns out. 
Even if we could ascertain an investor’s time horizon, there are too 
many investors to say what all investors’ time horizons are. “In practice, 
of course, shareholders are often not a homogeneous block with a 
collective interest. . . . ”47 As one author noted:  
 
A single shareholder, or multiple shareholders with 
homogeneous preferences, would in theory be able to 
specify a single objective for running the firm. 
Shareholders with private interests, however, might prefer 
the firm to pursue those interests at the expense of the 
interests they have in common with other 
shareholders. . . . 
 Thus, when shareholders have divergent private 
interests, it is no longer accurate to think of shareholder 
action as a collective good. That conception depends on 
there being a uniform maximand for all shareholders.48  
 
 Thus, shareholders have short-term and long-term interests, 
hedged and unhedged positions, diversified and undiversified interests, 
inside versus outside shareholders, social and economic interests (if public 
pensions) and labor interests (if labor union pension funds). These 
concerns are not limited only to these investors49 and liquidity versus 
capital appreciation preferences. Variations on the basic stock security 
have their own target horizons, as with options, warrants, conversions (e.g. 
convertible bonds), stock redemption and repurchase dates, and covered 
puts and calls. Another set of targets lie within executive incentive 
compensation plans with their different stock options that have largely and 
miserably failed to fix the agency problem by turning managers into active 
shareholders-in-control but, instead, created another opportunistic means 
for managerial enrichment and extraction of surplus.50 There are even 
                                                     
 47. The Business of Business, ECONOMIST (Mar. 21, 2015), https://www.economist.com/ 
news/business/21646742-old-debate-about-what-companies-are-has-been-revived-business-business; 
see also Hayden & Bodie, supra note 43. 
 48. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
561, 575 (2006). 
 49. Id. at 579–91. 
50. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561, 566; Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder 
Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE. U. L. REV. 
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“phantom” shareholders who are credited with stock under incentive 
compensation plans but do not actually own shares.51 Diversified 
stockholders have multiple investments and may prefer single-minded 
emphasis on shareholder wealth maximization (whatever that really is), 
while non-diversified investors are (or are like) the founding entrepreneurs 
whose interests may be closer to bondholders and employees.52  
 
[A] diversified investor will prefer that management of 
any individual company pursue the highest risk-adjusted 
return even at the risk of the ruin of the company. In 
contrast, an undiversified investor—one with all of his or 
her eggs in one basket — will care very much whether 
that one company survives. In short, an undiversified 
stockholder is risk-averse.53  
 
Stephen Bainbridge expands on this divergence in interest:  
 
Shareholder investment time horizons are likely to vary 
from short-term speculation to long-term buy-and-hold 
strategies, for example, which in turn is likely to result in 
disagreements about corporate strategy. Even more 
prosaically, shareholders in different tax brackets are 
likely to disagree about such matters as dividend policy, 
as are shareholders who disagree about the merits of 
allowing management to invest the firm’s free cash flow 
in new projects.54 
 
Perhaps only private equity investors give a clear holding period 
demand in their stated three- to five-year investment horizons (5.5 is the 
average length),55 but this type of rigid investment philosophy effectively 
caters to a particular type of investor. It begs the question of how to address 
                                                     
1169, 1176 (2016); Ric Marshall, Out of Whack: U.S. CEO Pay and Long-term Investment Returns, 
MSCI RES. INSIGHT, https://www.msci.com/ceo-pay [https://perma.cc/MBS6-N3DA]. 
 51. D. Kyle Sampson, Comment, The Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors to “Phantom” 
Stockholders, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1277–78 (1995). 
 52. Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (Or How Investor 
Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 435–36 (1998). 
 53. Id. at 442 (footnote omitted). 
 54. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601, 623 (2006). 
 55. Amy Or, Average Private Equity Holding Times Drops to 5.5 Years, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 
2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2015/06/10/average-private-equity-hold-times-drop-to-5-
5-years/. 
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the duties the board owes the firm when the shareholder base has diverse 
horizons, as in the case in publicly-traded corporations. 
A further way to classify the different types of investors is by how 
they invest. Many investors have little interest in the company qua 
company. They care not for the fundamentals. These investors follow the 
pattern of stock prices with the view that they can determine trends that 
will allow them to profit. The technical stock trader (also called a 
“chartist”) looks at moving averages and trading volume and trends of the 
market as a whole. Malkiel says, “A true chartist doesn’t even care to know 
what business or industry a company is in, as long as he can study its stock 
chart.”56 Under Modern Portfolio Theory, the advantage of eliminating 
company specific risks results in focus on individual security selection.57 
Eugene Fama wrote:  
 
[P]ortfolio theory tells us that the optimal portfolio for any 
investor is likely to be diversified across the securities of 
many firms. Since he holds the securities of many firms 
precisely to avoid having his wealth depend too much on 
any one firm, an individual security holder generally has 
no special interest in personally overseeing the detailed 
activities of any firm.58  
With limited interest in particular companies and greater interest in 
portfolio asset allocation and diversification, we should expect that this 
category of investors, however long-term their horizon, to have little 
interest in seeing themselves as owners of the corporation. 
Investor focus on company-specific fundamental analysis varies 
widely. Some investors focus their analysis within certain sectors of the 
market, based on factors such as market capitalization, style, or industry 
(sector). Examples would be small cap value, mid-cap growth, utility or 
airline or biotechnology companies, etc., with the result that whichever 
companies fall into that sectors are the ones the investor examines and 
                                                     
 56. BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 118 (1996). 
 57. BOGLE, supra note 29, at 235–36; MALKIEL, supra note 56, at 203–05; DAVID SWENSEN, 
UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS, A FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO PERSONAL INVESTMENT 21 (2005) 
[hereinafter SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS] (“Security selection plays a minor role in 
investment returns, because investors tend to hold broadly diversified portfolios that correlate 
reasonably strongly with the overall market.”); SWENSEN, PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, 
supra note 1, at 55–58; Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288, 291 (1980). 
 58. Fama, supra note 57, at 291. 
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holds.59 Some mutual funds specialize in fulfilling these sectors; the firm 
Dimensional Fund Advisors specializes in this portfolio sector slicing and 
is a favorite of financial planners.60 Even within sectors, the investor, be it 
an individual or a fund, can be largely passive and not follow individual 
company issues. For example, exchange-traded funds (ETF) provide a 
portfolio of stocks, typically an index, which can be traded as a portfolio61 
and can focus on narrow market sectors, even commodities and 
currencies.62 ETFs can be traded throughout the day,63 which can create 
the need for the ETF to buy and sell the underlying stock holdings. 
Given the heterogeneity of investors at any one point in time, we 
contend that trying to ascertain an investor’s time horizon for his/her/its 
investments is infeasible standing alone, infeasible for reconciling diverse 
time horizons and not workable for directors in determining the corporate 
investment horizon to correspond with the investors’ time horizons. 
Corporate directors, therefore, would be in the irreconcilable position of 
appeasing the demands of multiple investors demanding returns across 
multiple conflicting periods. 
 The corporation conceivably can be immortal, so its own investment 
decisions can conceivably be similarly long-term,64 although evolving 
businesses, markets and technologies will require adjustments, not static 
investment decisions. Having a very long corporate investment horizon 
would match only a subset of investors, such as university endowments, 
foundations, and sovereign wealth funds. 
The heterogeneity is also a moving problem with rolling periods 
because individual investor time horizons are subject to change. Every 
year shareholders make new stock purchases, stock sales, related mutual 
fund purchases, and mutual fund redemptions for different reasons. As a 
result, the investor who originally had a ten-year horizon now has a nine-
year horizon; meanwhile, new investors have a ten-year horizon. Only if 
we look at some demographic shift in an aging population that will redeem 
                                                     
59. JOHN A. HASLEM, MUTUAL FUNDS, 206–09 (2003); Bruce D. Westervelt, Adding Value 
Through Equity Style Management, in INDEXING FOR MAXIMUM INVESTMENT RESULTS 237–42 
(Albert S. Neubert ed., 1998). 
 60. Robert Barker, So You Think Stock Picking Is a Fool’s Game, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 18, 
2002, at 144; Ian Salisbury, The New Faces of Stock Picking, TIME (Jan. 13, 2014), http://time.com/ 
money/2795053/beat-the-market-without-picking-stocks/ [https://perma.cc/EZ5N-CX36]; Charles 
Stein, Charming Investors by Playing Hard to Get, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2015, at 41. 
 61. GARY L. GASTINEAU, THE EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS MANUAL 110 (2002). 
 62. DAVID J. ABNER, THE ETF HANDBOOK 162 (2d ed. 2016); FRANCIS GROVES, EXCHANGE 
TRADED FUNDS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO EFTS 71–87 (2011). 
 63. GROVES, supra note 62, at 69; see also GASTINEAU, supra note 61, at 80. 
 64. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 773–74 
(2012); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, 
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE. U. L. REV. 685, 694–95 (2015). 
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more than it invests, might we see some time horizon buoy on the waves 
of investment flows. 
II. OTHER DOUBTS ABOUT MATCHING INVESTOR TIME HORIZON’S 
TO THE COMPANY’S 
For the question posed at this symposium, it might be sufficient to 
stop here with the problem of the heterogeneity of investor time horizon 
providing no definitive direction to the management of the firm. But there 
are other reasons why we ought not to look at investor time horizons to 
guide the company’s investment horizon. Those reasons are (1) in the 
modern corporation of diversified ownership, common stock investors do 
not actually own the company, although they get to vote on directors and 
management proposals (and some of the shareholder’s own tendered 
proposals); (2) agency theory itself relies on the fiction of shareholder 
ownership of the company to support the theory; (3) agency theory, as 
supplanted by the more lofty theory of contractualism, dispenses with even 
the fictive assumption that shareholders own the corporation. These points 
follow. 
A. Ownership of Stock Shares Is Not Ownership of The Company 
There is no legal basis for the contention that shareholders own the 
corporation, which is often made under the agency model of corporate 
finance (discussed below). Corporate law states the contrary. 
“Shareholders just own shares—that is, bundles of entitlements such as the 
right to receive dividends and to vote on certain issues.”65 
Corporations come into existence upon the filing and approval of the 
articles of incorporation, not when shares are sold.  
Under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and 
state corporation statutes with comparable provisions, 
unless a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate 
existence begins when the articles of incorporation are 
filed. In comparison, under the old Model Business 
Corporation Act upon the issuance of the certificate of 
incorporation, the corporate existence begins.66  
Various corporate statutes support this assertion. California law 
provides that “corporate existence begins upon the filing of the articles and 
                                                     
 65. The Business of Business, supra note 47. 
 66. MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 166. See generally 1A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 166. 
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continues perpetually, unless otherwise expressly provided by law or in 
the articles.”67 Delaware law provides:  
Upon the filing with the Secretary of State of the 
certificate of incorporation, executed and acknowledged 
in accordance with § 103 of this title, the incorporator or 
incorporators who signed the certificate, and such 
incorporator’s or incorporators’ successors and assigns, 
shall, from the date of such filing, be and constitute a body 
corporate, by the name set forth in the certificate, subject 
to § 103(d) of this title and subject to dissolution or other 
termination of its existence as provided in this chapter.68  
Georgia law provides:  
(a) Unless a delayed effective date is specified, the 
corporate existence begins when the articles of 
incorporation are filed. (b) The Secretary of State’s filing 
of the articles of incorporation is conclusive proof that the 
incorporators satisfied all conditions precedent to 
incorporation except in a proceeding by the state to cancel 
or revoke the incorporation or involuntarily dissolve the 
corporation.69  
Maryland law provides, “When the Department accepts articles of 
incorporation for record, the proposed corporation becomes a body 
corporate under the name and subject to the purposes, conditions, and 
provisions stated in the articles.”70 Similarly, New York law provides:  
Upon the filing of the certificate of incorporation by the 
department of state, the corporate existence shall begin, 
and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence that all 
conditions precedent have been fulfilled and that the 
corporation has been formed under this chapter, except in 
an action or special proceeding brought by the attorney-
general.71  
                                                     
67. CAL. CORP. CODE § 200 (West 2014). 
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 106 (West 2017). 
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-203 (West 2017). 
70. MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-102 (West 2017). 
71. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 403 (McKinney 2017). 
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Also, Pennsylvania law states, “Upon the filing of the articles of 
incorporation in the Department of State or upon the effective date 
specified in the articles of incorporation, whichever is later, the corporate 
existence shall begin.”72 Finally, Washington law provides that “[u]nless 
a delayed effective date is specified, the corporate existence begins when 
the articles of incorporation are filed.”73 
Corporations need capital, which is raised by selling shares.74 “It is 
not a prerequisite to corporate existence that there be shares of stock issued 
or outstanding. The corporation comes into existence when its articles of 
incorporation are filed with the Secretary of State,” said the court in 
Brodsky v. Seaboard Realty Co.75 “That certificates of stock were not 
issued does not detract from this conclusion, for the incorporators became 
stockholders and were entitled to have issued to them the certificates for 
the number of shares which they had subscribed for,” said the court in J.W. 
Williams Co. v. Leong Sue Ah Quin;76 other cases interpreting statutes to 
this point are Hammond v. Strauss77 and Hawes v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum 
Co.78 In fact, a corporation could buy back all its outstanding shares, as 
treasury stock, without delimiting or denigrating the existence of the 
corporation, although a few states limit repurchases to surplus capital.79  
The assertion that stock shares constitute ownership of the modern 
corporation is tenuous because the rights of the shareholders are limited to 
the right to vote, the right to inspect the books and records, the right to 
hold directors accountable for misconduct,80 the right to preempt (if 
granted by statute or by the articles of incorporation),81 and the right to any 
residual value after all creditors and preferred stockholders are paid.82 This 
puts us back to Berle and Means’ shareholders who have indefinite 
                                                     
72. 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1309 (West 2017). 
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.02.030 (West 2017). 
 74. See generally 1 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 6:24 (5th ed.). 
 75. 206 Cal. App. 2d 504, 515–16 (1962). 
 76. 44 Cal. App. 296, 298 (1919). 
 77. See generally 53 Md. 1 (1880). 
 78. See generally 101 Mass. 385 (1869). 
 79. 11 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2847 (discussing the history of treasury shares and the early 
prohibitions on buybacks to as “a violation of its charter and a diversion of its funds to an authorized 
purpose,” and to avoid “impairment of its capital needed for the protection of creditors.”); see also id. 
§§ 2848–49, 5148, 2845; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.31 (2010) (AM. BAR ASS’N). 
 80. See generally 1 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 6:43 (5th ed.); David J. Berger, One Practitioner’s 
Random Thoughts on Shareholders’ Rights in the Modern Corporation, in 1 THE ACCOUNTABLE 
CORPORATION 121–28 (Marc J. Epstein & Kirk O. Hanson eds., 2006); George D. Hornstein, Rights 
of Stockholders in the New York Courts, 56 YALE L.J. 942 (1947). 
 81. 1 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 6:44 (5th ed.). 
 82. Hornstein, supra note 80, at 955. 
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expectations and interests “in the form of distributions and what appraisal 
an open market will make of these expectations,”83 where “appraisal” 
means tradable nature in liquid stock markets.84 
What is the origin of the belief that common shareholders own the 
corporation and therefore the corporation should be run in their interest? 
The assertion of ownership by the shareholders and their right to financial 
information was noted before the “[c]rash” by William Ripley in an 
important article preceding Berle and Means’ work.85 Another pre-Berle 
book, Business Ownership Organization, describes stockholders as the 
owners of capital: “stocks . . . represent an ownership interest or 
contributions of capital to remain permanently in the business,” as against 
bondholders who expect to receive their loans plus interest,86 (although the 
author is not consistent, later describing the ownership of shares as 
representing an ownership interest87 and then later as an equitable 
interest88). As Ripley and Benjamin Graham noted in their practice of 
“shareholder activism,” management disregarded the stockholders’ 
assertion of interest in the company, often brushing off investor inquiries 
with the admonition to sell the stock if they did not like how the company 
was run.89 
“By tradition, a corporation ‘belongs’ to its shareholders,” wrote 
Berle and Means, but this meant the directors would then act as “trustees 
                                                     
 83. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 277, 286–287. The appraisal idea was later developed as 
a theory of locked-in capital, whereby shareholders could not redeem their shares back to the 
corporation absent some repurchase agreement, but, instead, sold to other investors, making those 
shares “liquid” in an open market. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 253 (2005) (exploring implications of equity capital lock-in); see also Margaret M. Blair, 
Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 
51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003). 
 84. AGLIETTA & REBÉRIOUX, supra note 5, at 35 (contending that this liquidity “provides 
[shareholders] with a capacity for exit and diversification without equal, in any case much higher than 
that of the employees”). 
 85. William Z. Ripley, Stop, Look, Listen! The Shareholder’s Right to Adequate information, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 1926), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1926/09/stop-look-listen-the-
shareholders-right-to-adequate-information/376225/ [https://perma.cc/BRM3-E7WJ]. 
 86. ARCHIBALD H. STOCKDER, BUSINESS OWNERSHIP ORGANIZATION 14 (1922). 
 87. Id. at 86. 
 88. Id. at 451. 
 89. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE MEMOIRS OF THE DEAN OF WALL STREET 203 (1996); see 
also id. at 199–216. Graham was one of the first to seek out undervalued companies and try to improve 
them through shareholder activism, as related in his account of trying to get the management the 
Northern Pipeline Company to issue a larger dividend starting in 1925. Armour and Cheffins more 
recently studied the period and concluded that “offensive shareholder activism” was rare during this 
period, in part due to the same reasons that Graham and Ripley found but led Graham to his success—
the lack of available information. John H. Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, Origins of “Offensive” 
Shareholder Activism in the United States, in ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY 253–76 
(Johnathan GS Koppel ed., 2001). 
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for the sole benefit of inactive and irresponsible security owners.”90 
William Allen explains the “tradition” was based on 19th century 
corporate law and practice, where “corporate shareholders during this 
period did not enjoy the protection of limited liability to the same degree 
as they modernly do,” with the corporation existing as “essentially the 
stockholders in a special form” for whom the “directors were seen as 
agents of the stockholders.”91 Wells explains this period:  
 
Only unanimous shareholder consent could change a 
corporation’s purpose, which points to a second 
distinctive feature of nineteenth century corporation law: 
not only did it constrain the corporation’s activities, but it 
also gave meaningful control to shareholders. The 
Board’s power over the corporation was, in theory, 
limited to managing its day-to-day affairs.92 
 
Other research shows there has long been a question about what 
ownership of shares meant as to ownership of the corporation. Epstein 
explains that the notion of shareholders owning parts of the corporation 
and having the right to vote arose from the New York Stock Exchange’s 
requirements and promotions (starting in the 1940s) that attempted to 
equate stock ownership with “the political metaphor of corporate 
democracy.”93 Initially, the goals were to restore public confidence in the 
stock market and thus, draw out the public’s savings in government bonds, 
and then later, (as the then president of the American Stock Exchange 
testified to Congress) to forestall government regulation by showing that 
investors were overseeing the corporations.94 Colleen Dunlavy similarly, 
and with greater detail, develops the history of shareholder voting rights, 
noting that in the 19th century the concern was horizontal imbalance 
among shareholders to plutocratic control, which was addressed by 
statutes mandating one-share one-vote, to the post-war 20th century 
statutory changes to deal with the vertical imbalance between shareholders 
                                                     
 90. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 354. 
 91. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 261, 266 (1992). 
 92. Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920-1940, 11 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 
573, 582 (2009). 
 93. EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE CORPORATION?: MANAGEMENT VS. SHAREHOLDERS 
7–8 (1986). 
 94. Id. at 8–10. 
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and management.95 Harwell Wells points out that prior to the post-war 
period, the vast majority of securities were bonds and preferred shares 
because people viewed common stock as speculative.96 Hayden and Bodie 
assert a similar view: 
 
Shareholder primacy could simply be viewed as a 
democratic legitimacy argument: the corporation has to 
keep shareholder interests at the forefront because 
shareholders are the voting polity. But this puts the cart 
before the horse: after all, who made the shareholders the 
voting polity? The choice of this group as the 
enfranchised citizenry is what needs justifying. A variant 
of this justification is that shareholders are the 
corporation's “owners” and thus are entitled to the 
ownership rights of profits and control. However, the 
ownership justification is also doomed by its circularity: 
who made the shareholders the “owners”? As corporate 
law commentators have convincingly pointed out, 
shareholders simply purchase a set of rights from the 
corporation. The right to vote is made part of the stock 
ownership “bundle,” but a stock could be constructed 
(and has at times been constructed) without the right to 
elect directors. Even shareholders with the right to vote 
do not possess many of the rights that traditionally accrue 
to property owners--the right to exclude, for example, or 
the right of possession. Labeling shareholders “owners” 
is no more of a justification for the vote than is labeling 
them “voters.”97 
 
Epstein calls shareholders “nominal owners,”98 which is probably 
more accurate than cases that refer to shareholders as equitable or 
“beneficial owners,”99 these latter terms being considerably ambiguous 
unless used to identify beneficial owners of shares held in street name or 
                                                     
 95. Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of 
Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1359–65 (2006). 
 96. Wells, supra note 92, at 586–87. 
 97. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 43, at 473; cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder 
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688–94 (2007) (arguing that the shareholder vote accomplishes little 
due to structural impediments in governance and voting). 
 98. EPSTEIN, supra note 93, at 13. 
 99. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F2d. 659, 681 (3rd Cir. 1970), vacated on 
other grounds 404 U.S. 403 (1972). 
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trust,100 in a close corporation,101 preferred shareholders,102 owners trying 
to sue to recover debts of the inactive or dissolved corporation,103 or 
derivative suits,104 as the cases in the footnote illustrate. And when looking 
at individual retirement investors through their employer-provided 401(k) 
and 403(b), accounts, “nominal owners” and “beneficial owners” look like 
accurate terms to describe the employee putting money into the employer-
provided plans, which are overseen by the employers as fiduciaries (with 
many under ERISA), with separate third-party record keepers and 
administrators, multiple fund companies, mutual fund managers and sub-
managers, trustees for the retirees, stock custodians and transfer agents. 
Thus, the terms “nominal” or “beneficial owner,” as terms, make more 
sense for the employee-investor through multiple layers of administrators 
and intermediaries.  
Julian Velasco contends the “tradition” of ownership should be 
right—that shareholders own the corporation—but admits there is no law 
that actually supports this tradition.105  
                                                     
 100. See, e.g., Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1991); Phillips v. United Corp., 
No. 40-497, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1947); Bird v. Wilmington Soc. of Fine 
Arts, 43 A.2d 476 (Del. 1945); In re Digex S’holders Litig., No. 18336-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002); Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d 615, 620–21 (Tex. 2012).  
 101. See generally Continental Bank v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 392, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972); Kauffman-Harmon v. Kauffman, 36 P.3d 408, 409–410 (Mont. 2001); Snyder v. Freeman, 266 
S.E.2d 593, 597–99 (N.C. 1980) (finding an express shareholder agreement for issuance of shares in 
place of the money owed as a creditor); Commonwealth v. Woodlands Cemetery Co., 13 Pa. D. & 
C.2d 548, 549-550 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.1957) (finding that a corporation established to operate a cemetery 
and certificate holders were granted rights to the land); Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Tex. 
2015) (“Ownership of the entities comprising the family business has remained within the Webre 
family.”); McAlister v. Eclipse Oil Co., 98 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1936) (when there are three 
stockholders, “strictly speaking, the ownership of the stock does not carry with it the equitable title to 
the corporate property. This simply means, however, that the stockholders have no right to require the 
corporation to convey to them the legal title to the corporate property. In a larger or real sense the 
stockholders of a corporation are the beneficial owners of its corporate properties”).   
 102. Cotton v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687, 697 (Tex. App. 2006) (referring 
to the preferred shareholder as “equitable or beneficial owner” with a right to inspect), overruled on 
other grounds Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014). 
 103. See generally Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Blankenburg, 235 S.W.2d 891, 893–94 (Tex. 
1951); Aransas Pass Harbor Co. v. Manning, 94 Tex. 558, 563, (Tex. 1901) (“A stockholder, merely 
as such, has no direct agency in the control of the business of the corporation. He has no direct interest 
in the property. His right to such property is collateral. But in its last analysis, the stockholders are the 
beneficial owners of the assets of the corporation. This proceeding is instituted upon the theory, which 
we think a correct one, that the shareholders are the ultimate owners of the corporate property, and, 
when the corporation is dissolved and its creditors are satisfied, they hold title to the assets in 
proportion to their respective shares.”); Timbertech, Inc. v. Wallboards, Inc., No. 14-98-00422-CV, 
1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 6397, *2 (Tex. App. 1999); ; Zimmerman v. Kyte, 765 P.2d 905, 12 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1988). 
 104. E.g., Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 173–174, (Tex. 2015). 
 105. Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 930 (2010). 
634 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:613 
 
Admittedly, it is difficult to find very much case law 
directly addressing the issue of ownership. However, 
there is a great deal of case law that implicitly reaffirms 
the traditional view. For example, as discussed earlier, 
Delaware courts generally insist that the directors of a 
corporation owe their fiduciary duties ‘to the corporation 
and its shareholders.’ Unfortunately, [unlike Delaware,] 
most of the courts’ statements on fiduciary duties are 
ambiguous. While they do support the traditional view, 
they also can be interpreted consistently with other 
theories.106  
 
On the contrary, there is law against the traditional assertion, such as a 
1932 Texas case, McClory v. Schneider, which cites to even earlier cases. 
 
A transfer of stock of a corporation or a transfer of 
certificates of stock which only evidence the stock, is held 
not to be a transfer of the property and assets of the 
corporation itself. The owner of a share of stock in a 
corporation owns no part of the capital, and is not the 
owner nor entitled to the possession of any definite 
portion of its property or assets. Hence the purchaser of 
stock in a corporation does not purchase any portion of 
the corporation’s assets, nor is a sale of all the stock of a 
corporation a sale of the physical properties of the 
corporation.107  
 
Additionally, John Armour shifts the meaning of ownership from 
ownership of the corporation to ownership of the residual rights.108 
About 100 years of arguments have yet to settle the question about 
whether shareholders (particularly those in large, publicly-listed 
corporations) are owners. Arguments and metaphors are the only 
underpinnings that exist. So, roughly $22 trillion in the U.S. stock markets 
exists without any certainty that the investors own anything more than a 
stock certificate in paper or electronic form, plus the residual after 
everyone else who does have an identifiable claim on the assets clears 
those out. 
                                                     
 106. Id.  
 107. McClory v. Schneider, 51 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. App. 1932). 
 108. John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, 27 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429, 437 (2007). 
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Berle and Means rejected both this theory (or tradition) of 
shareholders owning the corporation, and its opposite theory, that the 
controlling powers could operate the corporation in their own self-
interest,109 which became known as the “managerialist” theory110. Berle 
and Means instead chose a third course, stating:  
[T]he owners of passive property, by surrendering control 
and responsibility over the active property, have 
surrendered the right that the corporation should be 
operated in their sole interest,—they have released the 
community from the obligation to protect them to the full 
extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights, 
[thus leading] the community . . . to demand that the 
modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the 
control but all society, [thereby] balancing a variety of 
claims by various groups in the community.111  
The point was not to “line shareholders’ pockets regardless of the 
consequences,” but “to bring managerial discretion under legal control.”112 
This was in the context of shareholders being middle-class and working-
class people who were now holding stocks113 (not through mutual 
funds114), and not the corporate raiders of the 1970s. This was to further 
“disperse ownership and economic power widely . . . against the action of 
powerful elite interest what would want to counteract the threats of the 
egalitarian operation of the corporation.”115 
B. The Myth of Agency Theory 
It is worth looking at the fictions and assumptions in the agency 
theory literature that created this myth of shareholder value, which has led 
to the idea that the shareholder’s investment time horizon is the guide for 
                                                     
 109. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 354. 
 110. Bratton, supra note 5, at 1476. 
 111.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 355–56 (the “community” Berle and Means refer to is 
synonymous with “stakeholders”). 
 112. Fenner Stewart, Jr., Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten Perspective 
for Reconsideration During the Rise of Finance, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1457, 1464, 1478 (2011); see 
also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf 
Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 107–11 (2008). 
 113. Stewart, supra note 112, at 1458, 1462–63. 
 114. A few mutual funds existed in the late 1920s, but the impetus for the growth and regulation 
of mutual funds was the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 
1940. See James E. McWhinney, A Brief History of the Mutual Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/mfhistory.asp [https://perma.cc/CB8P-KRGW]. 
 115. Stewart, supra note 112, at 1463. 
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the corporation’s investment horizon. The myth of shareholder value was 
exposed by Lynn Stout,116 among others, because of its consequential 
derailing of corporate governance from the law’s view of corporate 
governance and relations between shareholders and the directors and the 
corporation. 
Despite Berle’s essential rejection of the idea of shareholders owning 
the corporation, Berle’s conception of the directors as trustees for the 
shareholders in aggregate in part, led all stakeholders to shift in the 1970s 
to the assumption that shareholders do own the corporation and therefore 
the corporation should maximize shareholder value.117 The assumption 
was in the economic finance literature, first by Milton Friedman,118 then 
formally developed as agency theory by Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling in their article, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.119 Jensen and Meckling said the 
relationship between stockholders and managers looked like an agency 
relationship, so it must be an agency relationship, which they created for 
their theory.120 But they needed more to make this work, so they created a 
“fiction” that the corporation had contracts with the shareholders: 
 
We retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part 
of all individuals in the analysis to follow. 
. . . . 
Since the relationship between the stockholders and 
manager of a corporation fit the definition of a pure 
agency relationship it should be no surprise to discover 
that the issues associated with the ‘separation of 
ownership and control’ in the modern diffuse ownership 
corporation are intimately associated with the general 
problem of agency. 
. . . . 
. . . Unfortunately, the analysis of these more 
general organizational issues is even more difficult than 
                                                     
 116. LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of 
Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE. 
U. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2013). See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 117. The shift from Berle’s conception to the agency conception and shareholder value 
maximization is chronicled in ROBERT TEITELMAN, BLOODSPORT (2016). 
 118. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 6. 
 119. See generally Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 120. Id. at 308.  
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that of the ‘ownership and control’ issue because the 
nature of the contractual obligations and rights of the 
parties: are much more varied and generally not as well 
specified in explicit contractual arrangements. 
. . . . 
. . . Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, 
not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, 
creditors, etc. The problem of agency costs and 
monitoring exists for all of these contracts, independent 
of whether there is joint production in their sense; i.e., 
joint production can explain only a small fraction of the 
behavior of individuals associated with a firm.  
It is important to recognize that most organizations 
are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set 
of contracting relationships among individuals. 
. . . . 
The private corporation or firm is simply one form 
of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting 
relationships and which is also characterized by the 
existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and 
cashflows of the organization which can generally be sold 
without permission of the other contracting individuals.121 
 
Note that Jensen and Meckling developed two ideas here: one of 
agency problem and another of imaginary contracts.122 Eugene Fama 
abandoned the shareholders-as-owners fiction for his expansion of Jensen 
and Mecklin’s contractual theory.123 
 
The firm is viewed as a set of contracts among factors of 
production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest. 
Because of its emphasis on the importance of rights in the 
organization established by contracts, this literature is 
characterized under the rubric ‘property rights.’ . . . 
. . . [T]he firm as a set of contracts among factors of 
production. In effect, the firm is viewed as a team whose 
members act from self-interest but realize that their 
destinies depend to some extent on the survival of the 
team in its competition with other teams. This insight, 
however, is not carried far enough. In the classical theory, 
                                                     
 121. Id. at 307–11, 309 n.10 (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at 307–11. 
123. Fama, supra note 57, at 289–91. 
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the agent who personifies the firm is the entrepreneur who 
is taken to be both manager and residual risk bearer. . . . 
The main thesis of this paper is that separation of 
security ownership and control can be explained as an 
efficient form of economic organization within the ‘set of 
contracts’ perspective. We first set aside the typical 
presumption that a corporation has owners in any 
meaningful sense. The attractive concept of the 
entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes 
of the large modern corporation. Instead, the two 
functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur, 
management and risk bearing, are treated as naturally 
separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. 
. . . . 
However, ownership of capital should not be 
confused with ownership of the firm. Each factor in a firm 
is owned by somebody. The firm is just the set of 
contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create 
outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared 
among inputs. In this ‘nexus of contracts’ perspective, 
ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept. Dispelling 
the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security 
holders is important because it is a first step toward 
understanding that control over a firm’s decisions is not 
necessarily the province of security holders. 
. . . . 
. . . [P]ortfolio theory tells us that the optimal 
portfolio for any investor is likely to be diversified across 
the securities of many firms. Since he holds the securities 
of many firms precisely to avoid having his wealth depend 
too much on any one firm, an individual security holder 
generally has no special interest in personally overseeing 
the detailed activities of any firm. In short, efficient 
allocation of risk bearing seems to imply a large degree of 
separation of security ownership from control of a firm.124 
 
Outside directors are hired to act as referees to the internal 
contracts and collusion of management.125 Milton Friedman 
previously justified using completely unrealistic, even erroneous 
                                                     
 124. Id. at 289–91 (emphasis added). 
125. Id. at 294. 
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assumptions, if they made the theory work, and this is informative to 
cracking the theories of the agency problem and nexus of contracts. 
 
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found 
to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate 
descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the 
more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the 
assumptions (in this sense). . . . 
To put this point less paradoxically, the relevant 
question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is not 
whether they are descriptively ‘realistic,’ for they never 
are, but whether they are sufficiently good 
approximations for the purpose in hand. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he “assumptions of a theory” play three 
different, though related, positive roles: (a) they are often 
an economical mode of describing or presenting a theory; 
(b) they sometimes facilitate an indirect test of the 
hypothesis by its implications and (c) as already noted, 
they are sometimes a convenient means of specifying the 
conditions under which the theory is expected to be valid. 
. . . . 
To state the point more generally, what are called the 
assumptions of a theory can be used to get some indirect 
evidence on the acceptability of the hypotheses in so far 
as the assumptions can themselves be regarded as 
implications of the hypothesis, and hence their conformity 
with reality as a failure of some implications to be 
contradicted, or in so far as the assumptions may call to 
mind other implications of the hypothesis susceptible to 
casual empirical observation. 
. . . . 
. . . Complete “realism” is clearly unattainable, and 
the question whether a theory is realistic ‘enough’ can be 
settled only by seeing whether it yields predictions that 
are good enough for the purpose in hand or that are better 
than predictions from alternative theories.126 
 
                                                     
 126. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 14–15, 23, 28, 41 (1953). 
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Thus, according to Friedman, the assumption is valid, however 
wrong, if it makes the theory work and the theory itself creates and justifies 
the assumption. 
Economist Kenneth Arrow noted the failure of the simple principal-
agent economic theory to fit with or explain the complex reality of 
contracts and complex relations, while the complex fee-functions the 
theory can generate are not found in actual contracts.127 Another problem 
is that imaginary contracts are always welfare-enhancing to both parties 
but real agreements are not always so, which is a problem for agency 
theory if the goal is contractual welfare that further obliges all the default 
rules the economic models of contracts require.128 
 
C. The Contractualism Theory That Underlays Agency Theory Is 
Uselessly Flawed Due to the Absence of Contracts 
 
The agency theory and its sibling, the contractual nexus, were key 
drivers for the shareholder value maximization ideology that developed in 
the 1970s and later129 (although Bratton contends these are also found in 
earlier conceptions of the corporation).130 As for the contractual relations 
used by the shareholders to direct the board of directors in their 
governance,131 this is pure fiction because there are absolutely no contracts 
between the common shareholders and the directors. There is not even a 
contract in the prospectus or registration statement as to obligations and 
rights between the corporation, its directors, and its shareholders.132 Even 
if stock purchasers were to look at the prospectus (a doubtful assumption 
after the initial public offering crowd), that would only bear upon the 
initial purchasers and maybe a couple of buyers beyond that (if one 
assumes that any of those subsequent stock purchasers looked at the 
prospectus). But beyond that, how many years out can that original 
prospectus still be relevant, if even found? (Corporate charters are a 
                                                     
 127. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE 
OF BUSINESS 37, 46–49 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 1985). 
 128. Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1748, 1751–52 
(1989). 
129. See, e.g., TEITELMAN, supra note 117; Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, supra note 116. 
 130. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm, Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1472 (1989). 
 131. See Peer Zumbansen, Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The Corporation as Governance 
Object, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1469, 1484–86 (2012), for an analysis of what Zumbansen calls 
“contract governance.” 
 132. The point is self-evident, but has also been raised in Victor Brudney, Corporate 
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1411 (1985). 
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different matter, but they are so generic about engaging in any lawful 
business as to be nearly useless as a guide for the business plan.) Besides, 
the stockholders’ rights are statutory, as determined by both state 
corporation law and the Securities and Exchange Acts.133  
The lack of a contract (strangely and remarkably) does not 
undermine agency theory because the theorists shift the contracts to a new 
problem of incomplete contracts, which are filled in with whatever 
assumptions fix the theory.134 As Stephen Bainbridge contends, the 
contract is “viewed as a metaphor rather than as a positive account of 
economic reality” that refers to “long-term relationships characterized by 
asymmetric information, bilateral monopoly, and opportunism.”135 This 
metaphor gets around the legal baggage of consideration, mutuality, and 
transactions, he says.136 
Susanna Ripken writes, “These ‘contracts’ are not true contracts as 
defined by law, but the economist’s notion of contracts as reciprocal 
arrangements involving mutual expectations between parties,”137 or as 
                                                     
 133. Wells calls them contractual, but he means this in contradistinction from the earlier 
corporate law charters granted by special acts of legislators. Wells, supra note 92, at 602. Wells further 
quotes Elwyn G. Davies, Reflections of the Amateur Draftsmen of the Ohio General Corporation Act, 
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Act “accepted and used as a basis the contract theory, though aware that when applied to a corporation 
with any considerable number of shareholders this theory has its limitations and there is no contract 
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written long before the economists employed contract theory in corporate theory, is Morris R. Cohen, 
The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933) (“As the result of the various forces that have 
thus supported the cult of contractualism there has been developed in all modern European countries 
(and in those which derive from them) a tendency to include within the categories of contract 
transactions in which there is no negotiation, bargain, or genuinely voluntary agreement.”). A 
contemporary assessment of contract theories in the contractarian context is Robert C. Clark, 
Contracts, Elites and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989). 
 135. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique 
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 871 (1997). 
 136. Id. Bainbridge contends the board of directors is the nexus of contracts. Id. We agree with 
Bainbridge that the firm has a “nexus,” and indeed is the nexus. Id. at 859. Certainly, the firm has 
contracts with some of the stakeholders, but we are doubtful of the assertion of a nexus of contracts 
outside of those contracts, and we disagree that the nexus of contracts is the directors. 
 137. Ripken, supra note 134, at 158. 
642 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:613 
rules rather than any real type of contract.138 Robert Clark identifies 
additional problems with the economic assumption and theory. 
Specifically, he notes that there is no bargaining, there are no implicit 
terms, basic fiduciary duties cannot be bargained around, and the role of 
directors is defined by fiduciary law as developed by case law and 
corporate statutes.  
 
No one has shown, and I believe it is clearly not the case, 
that legislative changes to corporate statutes typically 
represent efforts merely to codify as general presumptions 
certain rights and duties that have already become 
prevalent in actual contracts. Nor are court decisions 
elaborating the contours of particular fiduciary duties 
merely filling in the gaps and ambiguities of actual 
contracts between the litigants in question.139 
 
According to Paddy Ireland, what little basis there is for shareholders 
and directors having a contract traces back to joint stock companies, which 
looked like partnerships, though the rise of the corporation and limited 
liability meant the shareholders were no longer anything like partners.  
 
[W]ith the introduction by the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1844 of incorporation by registration, the relationship 
between the shareholders of most companies and third 
parties ceased to be contractual at all: third-party creditors 
now dealt not with a collection of partners liable for each 
other, but with companies as separate, property-owning, 
legal (and corporate) entities. 
. . . .  
. . . [T]he gradual demise of the partnership-based idea of 
directors as the agents of shareholders reflected the 
emergence of the company as a property-owning legal 
person and the erosion of the contractual character of the 
relationships of shareholders with both directors and one 
another. Once again, the growing detachment and 
                                                     
 138. See Fred S. McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique of 
Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (1990) (“This point goes back to the seminal contractarian 
model that every graduate student in economics studies. There, Coase defined the firm as the set of 
agreements by which individuals agree to operate by ongoing rules rather than a series of constantly 
renegotiated spot contracts. The advantage of contractual rules is the reduction of transaction costs.”). 
Id.  
 139. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 63 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). 
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externality of shareholders from ‘the company’ and the 
process of production lay at the root of these changes. 
Indeed, for courts and legislature, struggling to protect the 
new breed of shareholder and to secure the integrity of the 
share as a new intangible form of property, there were 
compelling reasons for moving away from a partnership-
based, overtly contractual conception of, and approach to, 
joint stock companies and their constituent relations.140 
 
Thus, shareholders do not own corporations, directors are not agents 
for the shareholders, and contracts between them do not exist.141 Rather, 
as Ripken concluded, the shareholders are only “the economist’s notion of 
rational self-interested actors,” the corporation “is the center of a mass of 
contracts,” and the result is that “no independent, real corporate entity 
exists,” meaning the corporation itself is a fiction, and the “ownership of 
the firm also disappears as a meaningful concept.”142 We might say the 
agency and contract theories have reached escape velocity of the orbit of 
reality.  
 
D. The Unified Theory of Shareholder Interest Belies the 
Heterogeneity of Shareholders’ Interests and Competencies 
 
Daniel Greenwood argues further that shareholders, in the corporate 
conception, are fictional.  
 
Shareholders are a convenient and sometimes extremely 
misleading metaphor that can prevent us from seeing the 
real rights and responsibilities at issue. . . . Rather, 
shareholders are treated as if their entire identity were 
their share ownership, as if their sole goal in life were to 
maximize the risk-adjusted present value of the future 
income stream represented by those shares and as if they 
                                                     
 140. Patty Ireland, Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory, 23 LEGAL STUD. 
453, 463, 465 (2003).  
With these and other related developments the law relating to joint stock 
companies increasingly departed from the ordinary principles of agency and 
contract which underlay the law of partnership. Indeed, by the final decades of 
the century, the processes of decontractualisation had become so advanced that 
company law finally separated out from the law of partnership, crystallizing 
into a fully autonomous, independent, and quite distinctive legal category.  
Id. at 471. 
 141. See, e.g., Bower, supra note 2, at 53; Brudney, supra note 132. 
 142. Ripken, supra note 134, at 158–59. 
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had no competing interests that might, even occasionally, 
warrant taking an action not designed to improve 
‘shareholder’ value.143 
Additionally, Greenwood states: 
. . . [T]he fictional shareholder is fundamentally different 
from the human beings who ultimately stand behind the 
fiction. The law and the legally created structure of 
corporation and market filter out all the complexity of 
conflicted, committed, particularly situated, deeply 
embedded and multi-faceted human beings, leaving only 
simple, one-sided monomaniacs. Human beings have 
short lives, spent in particular places with particular 
relationships to other human beings; they constantly 
confront the problems of finitude and commitment. 
Shareholders, in contrast, are in significant senses 
immortal, uncommitted and universal: They are 
indifferent as to time and place, language and religion. 
They are indifferent between projects and personalities. 
They are understood to care deeply about one important 
and vital human aim -- profit maximization -- but not at all 
about numerous others. While the ultimate owners of the 
shares are specific, situated, conflicted and committed 
human beings, shareholders in most instances may be 
thought of more appropriately as a “large, fluid, 
changeable and changing market.”144 
 
The problems and failures of corporate governance that emanated 
from the normative directive of abiding by a myth (as Stout called it) based 
on theories, in turn based on assumptions generated to justify the theory, 
have been chronicled in many articles addressing the limits of agency costs 
and principal control.145  
 
[C]entralization of essentially nonreviewable 
decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. The 
chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not that 
it permits the aggregation of large capital pools, as some 
                                                     
 143. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1029–30 (1996). 
 144. Id. at 1025–26. 
 145. See, e.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 50, at 564–70. 
2018] Flash Traders to Indexed Institutions 645 
have suggested, but rather that it provides a hierarchical 
decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of 
operating a large business enterprise with numerous 
employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other 
inputs. In such a firm, someone must be in charge . . . .146  
 
Sitkoff expands on this: 
 
Active monitoring is not a satisfactory answer to the 
agency problem. Even if the principal has spelled out 
what the agent should do in a particular contingency, it is 
often infeasible for the principal to monitor the agent’s 
compliance with those instructions. Agents are often 
retained because the principal lacks the specialized skills 
necessary to undertake the activity on his own. In such a 
case, the skill deficit that prompted the principal to engage 
the agent will limit the principal’s ability to monitor the 
agent.”147 Others note there are “principal costs” with 
having shareholders responsible for the majority of the 
corporation’s decision,148 and it is probably more efficient 
to delegate decision-making to “elites” (regulators, judges 
and legislators, even influential law professors and the 
American Law Institute with their expertise in relevant 
fields).149 
                                                     
 146. Bainbridge, supra note 54, at 626. 
 147. Symposium, The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust in The Twenty-First Century: A 
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 149. Clark, supra note 134, at 1723 (“[E]lites may have access to more and better information 
relevant to rule making. Elite rule makers may sometimes be better processors of whatever information 
is available, because of their intrinsic or acquired abilities, or because they are specialists who have 
the time to focus more carefully on available information, thus reaping economies of scale in its 
use. . . . Despite the agency costs generated by elitism and the unavoidably imperfect alignment of 
incentives that bring them about, elite rule making may have net benefits for rule subjects. There is no 
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Shareholders are not single-minded about corporate policy, but 
disregard of the shareholders led to minority oppression, which led to the 
normalization of the idea of shareholder primacy as “a way of forcing 
homogeneity onto a very diverse set of shareholder interests.”150 As Blair 
and Stout observed:  
 
Because American law does not permit shareholders to 
command the board to action, describing directors as 
shareholders’ “agents” grossly misrepresents at least the 
legal nature of their relationship. In the eyes of the law, 
corporate directors are a unique form of fiduciary who, to 
the extent they resemble any other form, perhaps most 
closely resemble trustees.151  
 
Shareholders are not principals, directors are not the agents for the 
shareholders, and directors’ decisions are not necessarily protected by the 
business judgment rule if they merely follow the instructions of the 
shareholders (the nominal alleged principals).152 Greenwood says: 
 
The general rule is that directors would be in breach of the 
law if they accepted such instructions. Like Edmund 
Burke’s statesman, but unlike the Populist legislative 
model of direction, initiative and referendum, directors 
are required to exercise independent judgment, not simply 
to follow their constituents’ -- let alone principals’ -- 
orders. Indeed, in the precise opposite of the agency law 
rule, directors are not necessarily protected in their 
decisions by turning a matter over to shareholders for 
decision, and may not defend a shareholder suit on the 
ground that they were doing no more than they were 
instructed to do or that they pledged to do prior to their 
appointment.153 
                                                     
a priori reason to preclude the possibility that the informational advantages of elite rule making may 
outweigh the agency costs it creates . . . .”). Id. at 1719–20. 
 150. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 43, at 480, 502. 
 151. Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 116, at 291. 
 152. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in 
Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 726–28, 731 (2006). 
 153. Greenwood, supra note 143, at 1041. Greenwood later agrees that shareholders are useful 
to the agency metaphor and guide the directors to put aside their own interests. See id. at 1044. But 
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A case that evinces this lack of shareholder authority to direct the 
corporation is Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,154 where the 
court affirmed Wal-Mart’s exclusion of a shareholder proposal that sought 
to compel Wal-Mart to stop the sale of high-capacity assault rifles. The 
court said Wal-Mart was right to exclude the proposal because it pertained 
to an ordinary business operations, and thus came within the SEC rule 14a-
8(i)(7), which “allows a company to exclude proposals that ‘deal . . . with 
a matter relating to the company’s business operations.’ 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8(i)(7).”155 
III. CONSERVATORSHIPS 
Finance literature offers a bridge from the concept of agency theory 
to a notion of the assets of the corporation as the key focus for governance. 
Oliver Williamson argues that the claims of the various providers of 
capital (e.g., debt and equity) are themselves “governance structures.”156 
In the Williamsonian view, the nature of the firm’s assets plays a large role 
in how those assets should be financed. “Redeployable” assets can be 
financed by “rules” (debt financing), while those assets that are “non-
redeployable” are better financed by equity since they require more 
discretion.157 While agency theory and Williamson’s view have some 
similarities because they both focus on discretion of the equity component, 
there is a key difference in the fundamental unit of analysis.158 In the 
Williamson framework,159 the transaction, as opposed to the agent, is the 
fundamental unit of analysis.160 
The transaction-based view of the firm allows a broader conception 
of governance in an era where shareholder–manager agency leads to the 
irreconcilable challenges of stock investor horizon or, even more broadly, 
                                                     
this is the same as the directors’ statutory duties to act in the interests of the corporation and not in 
their own self-interest. 
154. 792 F.3d 323, 352 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015).  
 155. Id.; see also Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated 
on other grounds, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (where the plaintiff sought to require Dow Chemical to include 
a shareholder proposal to stop the manufacture and sale of napalm then used in the Vietnam War. The 
court of appeals required the company to include the proposal, calling the shareholders “the true 
beneficial owners of the corporation”).  
 156. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. 
FIN. 567 (1988). 
 157. Id. at 567, 580 n.24, 581. 
 158. Id. at 571. 
 159. Id.  
 160. See generally Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979). 
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stock investor objective. The transactions cost view of corporate 
governance returns the emphasis to the nature of the firm’s assets. 
Shareholders, be they rapid traders or long-term holders, have a residual 
claim on firm assets. To the extent that corporate managers deploy capital 
other than equity, they share in the governance of the claims on firm assets. 
If the nature of the firm’s assets aligns with the use of both debt and equity, 
then the overall value of the enterprise may increase, assuming there are 
real world frictions such as deductibility of interest.161 
Thus, the shift from a shareholder-centric view of the firm to an 
asset-based view of the firm allows those who make operating and 
financing decisions to view the value of the firm more from a basis of 
assets than from a view of equity claims. This argument does not 
presuppose that managers (or any individual agent) do not act in their own 
interest. Notwithstanding these motives, the goal of acting on behalf of the 
corporation aligns better with a focus of what makes the corporation itself 
unique—its assets. The nature of the assets drives the major decisions of 
corporate finance, including capital structure, capital budgeting, and 
working capital management. “The conflict of interest between debt and 
equity over investment or distribution policy or capital structure implicates 
the economic question of whether the goal of the corporate decision-maker 
should be to maximize stockholders’ value rather than enterprise (and 
possibly creditors’) value if its decision affects those values differently.”162 
The financial model of transactions involving all assets aligns 
reasonably well with the conservatorship model of the corporation, 
whereby the directors are subject to fiduciary obligations of loyalty and to 
avoid self-dealing.163 Here, the directors are to act in the best interest of 
the corporation. This fits with the actual statutory duties imposed on 
directors: to act in the best interest of the corporation. For example, 
California’s Corporations Code provides: 
A director shall perform the duties of a director, including 
duties as a member of any committee of the board upon 
which the director may serve, in good faith, in a manner 
such director believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders . . . .164  
Under Connecticut law,  
                                                     
 161. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and 
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 261–97 (1958). 
 162. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 645 
(1997). 
 163. Id. at 601. 
164. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2017). 
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[a] director shall discharge his duties as a director, 
including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) In 
good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person 
in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes 
to be in the best interests of the corporation.165  
Georgia law provides, “A director shall discharge his duties as a 
director, including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) In a manner 
he believes in good faith to be in the best interests of the 
corporation . . . .”166 A few states insert this in the indemnity authorization 
statutes. For example, Delaware law allows indemnity for the director “if 
the person acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably 
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the 
corporation . . . .”167 Similarly, New York law allows for indemnification 
where a director “acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably 
believed to be in, or, in the case of service for any other corporation or any 
partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit plan or other enterprise, 
not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation . . . .”168 
The conservatorship model reconceives the directors as trustees 
rather than as mere agents for the amorphous and diverse group of 
shareholders, and, as Brudney says about fiduciaries, the exclusive benefit 
principle owed by the fiduciaries starts with “thick restrictions that 
substantially hamper their freedom to act with respect to, or to alter their 
state-imposed obligations to their beneficiaries.”169 “The corporation law 
does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to 
manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of 
shares.”170  
While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a 
corporation is not a New England town meeting; 
directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to 
                                                     
165. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2017).  
166. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-830(a)(1) (2017) (prior to May 9, 2017, amendment); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1(c) (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1541a 
(West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-8-30 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.357 (West 
2017); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 22.221 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (West 2017); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.300 (West 2017). 
 167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (West 2017). See generally Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. 
ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at *60–61 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017); 
In Re Trados, Inc. Shareholder Litig. 73 A.3d 17, 38 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
168. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney 2017). 
 169. Brudney, supra note 162, at 598. 
170. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 38 (quoting Paramount Commc’ns. Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10670, 
1989 WL 79880, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)). 
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manage the business and affairs of the corporation, 
subject however to a fiduciary obligation.171  
Thus, the directors’ duties cannot be reduced to mere contractual relations 
to be waived away by the beneficiaries because the power to consent by 
the beneficiary (whether by the corporation or the shareholders) is 
constrained.172 This also means the directors’ responsibility is higher than 
the business judgment rule, which can be used “to justify the board’s 
decision as long as judicial review, within the parameters of the business 
judgment rule presumption, can devise a minimum proper rationale for the 
decision.”173 The distinction is noted in In Re Trados Shareholder 
Litigation,174 which also allows three levels of review depending on the 
alleged misconduct.  
 
[E]ven though modern corporate law, as currently written, 
has shied away from describing corporate directors 
explicitly as ‘trustees,’ contemporary corporate theory 
has more or less explicitly moved back to the (original) 
notion that a trust relationship exist between the 
corporation’s directors/managers and its other 
participants and factors of production, and that those trust 
                                                     
 171. Id. (quoting TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., No. 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at 
*8 n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989)). 
 172. Brudney, supra note 162, at 606. But see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) (using the economic agency 
model to argue that anything voluntary—meaning the ability to enter the transaction or not—is a 
contract, and fiduciary duties are merely “free” terms the parties would have bargained for but can 
accomplish “costlessly in advance.” Id. at 1428, 1445. Additionally, “the dynamics of the market drive 
[managers] to act as if they had investors’ interests at heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible 
hand” because “how are members of state legislatures or other alternative rule-givers to do better?” 
Id. at 1419, 1432.).  
 173. René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: The Mechanics of Trusting, 
38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 103, 121–22 (2013); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as 
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 89–90 (2004) (“Two conceptions of the business judgment 
rule compete in the case law. One treats the rule as a standard of liability. Hence, for example, some 
courts and commentators argue that the business judgment rule shields directors from liability so long 
as they act in good faith. Others contend that the rule simply raises the liability bar from mere 
negligence to, say, gross negligence or recklessness. Alternatively, however, the business judgment 
rule can be seen as an abstention doctrine. In this conception, the rule’s presumption of good faith 
does not state a standard of liability but rather establishes a presumption against judicial review of 
duty of care claims. The court therefore abstains from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors’ 
conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule’s presumption of good faith.”); see 
also Brudney, supra note 162, at 635 (“Judicial review of the board’s decision in terms of ‘business 
judgement’ further supports the idea of the discretion available to parties in a ‘mere’ contractual 
relationship. While the phenomenon can be explained, it is hard to see how it can be justified.”). 
 174. 73 A.3d at 43. 
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relationships secure and control the fidelity and diligence 
of the former with regard to the firm investment interests 
of the latter.175  
 
The earlier notion of trust relationships was espoused most notably 
by Merrick Dodd,176 who asserted that directors should consider all the 
interests of capital, labor, and the public. This is a fiduciary duty. Some 
old cases did describe directors as trustees, or having a role in the nature 
of trustees, for the corporation and the shareholders—though not strictly a 
trustee, mostly because the directors do not hold title.177 For example, in 
Stewart v. Harris (and other cases noted in the footnote below): 
 
“. . . Directors and managing officers, in addition to their 
functions as mere agents, occupy a double position of 
partial trust. They are quasi or sub modo trustees for the 
corporation with respect to the corporate property, and 
they are quasi or sub modo trustees for the corporation 
with respect to the corporate property, and they are quasi 
or sub modo trustees for the stockholders with respect to 
their shares of the stock.” The Supreme Court of the 
United States, in Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, 22 L. 
Ed. 492, declared that “the managers and officers of a 
company, where capital is contributed in shares, are in a 
very legitimate sense trustees, alike for its stockholders 
and its creditors, though they may not be trustees 
technically and in form.”178 
                                                     
 175. Reich-Graefe, supra note 173, at 117–18. We reject the proposal to create a new layer of 
oversight, an “equity trustee,” to oversee the directors, proposed in Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717 (2010). 
 176. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1154–55 (1932) (“That there are three groups of people who have an interest in that institution. 
One is the group of fifty-odd thousand people who have put their capital in the company, namely, its 
stockholders. Another is a group of well toward one hundred thousand people who are putting their 
labor and their lives into the business of the company. The third group is of customers and the general 
public.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Quinn v. Forsyth, 158 S.E.2d 686, 691 (Ga. App. 1967) (“[W]hile a corporate 
director does not hold title and is not a strict trustee, ‘he does occupy a fiduciary relation to the 
stockholders with reference to their shares of stock, and this relationship obtains when such director 
is dealing with an individual stockholder in the purchase of such stockholder’s shares.’” (quoting 
Manning v. Wills, 17 S.E.2d 261, 266 (Ga. 1941))). 
 178. Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 280 (Kan. 1904) (first quoting POMEROY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 1090) (second quoting Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, 619 (1874)); see also 
Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 233–34 (Ga. 1903); Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 139 P. 879, 888–89 (Ariz. 
1913); Atkinson v. Marquart, 541 P.2d 556, 558 (Ariz. 1975); Williams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 469 
P.2d 583, 585 (Wash. App. 1970) (“Corporate officers and directors occupy a fiduciary relationship 
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The conservatorship model is similar to the concept of “mediating 
hierarchs,” proposed by Blair and Stout: 
 
who must balance the competing needs and demands of 
shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers, executives, 
rank-and-file employees, and even the local 
community . . . .  
. . .  
In reality, directors simply do not behave the way 
the principal-agent model predicts. They reward many 
groups with larger slices of the corporate pie when the pie 
is growing, and spread the loss among many when the pie 
is shrinking. Far from providing evidence that directors 
are doing something wrong by imposing ‘agency costs’ 
on shareholders, this observation suggests directors may 
be doing exactly what team production analysis says they 
should be doing—acting as mediating hierarchs who 
balance the conflicting interests of the many members 
who make up a healthy and productive corporate team.179 
 
Bratton also engages the concept of the mediating hierarch’s role, 
envisioning a director with the flexibility to adjust between relational 
contracts, discrete contracts, various parties, and capable of drawing on 
models of trust, agency, contract, and fiduciary principles. “A mediative 
conception of the [corporate] law can thus be useful, despite modest 
theoretical aspirations. It encourages better understanding of the ‘tough 
questions.’ Where two valid, but inconsistent, normative directives come 
to bear on a problem, mediation is required.”180 Additionally, Brudney 
observes that the economic principal-agency model that presumes self-
                                                     
to a private corporation and shareholders thereof akin to that of a trustee . . . .”); Burt v. Irvine Co., 47 
Cal. Rptr. 392, 406 (1965) (“It is hornbook law that directors, while not strictly trustees, are 
fiduciaries . . . .” (quoting Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74 (Cal. App. 
1952))). 
 179. Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 152, at 738–39. 
 180. William W. Bratton, Jr., Public Values, Private Business, and U.S. Corporate Fiduciary 
Law, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMICS 
OF REGULATION 23, 24–25 (Joseph McCahery et al. eds., 1993) (“Corporate law, by accepting 
disagreement on norms as an integral part of social and economic life, thereby helps us live with 
institutions despite disagreement. Corporate law must encompass entity and contract, fiduciary and 
contract, state and contact, trust and agency, self-interest and co-operation, welfare and goodwill, 
mandate and facilitation, so as to serve as a nexus of communicative action that contributes to 
corporate institutional stability.”) Id. at 33. 
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interest and contractual incentives actually reduces the state-imposed 
fiduciary duties and allows the agents “to engage in conflicts of interest 
transactions or otherwise to serve themselves . . . at the possible expense 
of public stockholders.”181 
The conservatorship model can also include the interests of other 
capital-providing stakeholders, such as stockholders and debt-holders, and 
many stakeholders beyond that, such as labor and communities, which is 
what both Dodd and Berle wanted in their conceptions of shareholder 
rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The ownership of a large, publicly-traded corporation is typically 
quite different from the ownership of a close or private corporation. 
Shareholder investment horizons in publicly traded firms are wildly 
different, varying from milliseconds to centuries. For a corporate director 
to act as an agent of this group of principals does nothing but beg questions 
about how it could be done. The answer is this: directors are not agents of 
the shareholders but are fiduciaries to the corporation itself, and they are 
obliged to manage the corporation in its best interest. The agency theory 
of shareholders that developed in the 1970s is not based on—and is, in 
fact, contrary to—corporate law. While legal fictions are recognized in the 
law, the agency theory was an economic fiction to justify a theory—a 
theory that then mutated into doctrine and mandated conformity to the 
theory rather than to law and practice. In contrast, Berle’s fiction of 
shareholder ownership was to create public benefit for widely held shares 
by a large shareholding population. That might still be realized through 
the institutional holdings where retirement savings are held, but trying to 
ascertain those many, diverse shareholders’ investment time horizons is 
unlikely to result in any guidance to directors, and should not provide 
guidance for corporate investment decisions. 
 
                                                     
 181. Brudney, supra note 163, at 623. 
